The Norman Conquest of England

By Edward A. Freeman , New York: MacMillan & Co., 1873

Excerpts from The History of the Norman Conquest of England:Its Causes and Its Results, vol. 4 Ch. 18

Summary

In the late 11th century, following his conquest of England, William - Duke of Normandy and now King of England - took steps to consolidate his rule. First, he chose to allow his new subjects to retain their native systems and structures, having himself crowned king using their altars and sites, and following their legal formalities. This gave him a moral advantage in battle, and an image of generosity and fairness to build on in governing his kingdom.

In consolidating his victories, William had to decide how to allocate his personal time and energy between his original duchy and his new kingdom, as well as how to act toward the native leaders of the conquered territories. And he had to choose a policy for dealing with problems that arose while he was away in Normandy: either relying on subordinates - a test, essentially, of his new subjects - or returning to deal with problems himself.

Conquering the remaining territory

[B]ear in mind the peculiar nature of William's position... William had taken [hold] of his Kingdom on the shore of Pevensey he had been solemnly invested with the kingly office before the altar at Westminster he had appeared as King and Conqueror before the eyes of his native subjects he had actual possession of many shires of England, and he held in his power such among the chiefs of the rest of the land as seemed likely to endanger his dominion.

He had now to establish his power over those parts of England where he was King only so far as that no one else was King. And it was by the sword that his power was established. It was now, for more than half England, that the Conquest really began. And it was now that William reaped the fruit of his great victory and of his coronation. No rival King or leader acknowledged by the whole Kingdom appeared against him. The land was therefore conquered piecemeal, and William was enabled to use the force of one district to overcome the resistance of another. And, as the King, he had the great moral advantage of being able to brand all resistance to the establishment of his power as rebellion against a power already lawfully established.

The return to Normandy

It is a natural question to ask why, when William must have seen that his hold over England was so imperfect, he should have left the country so long without the restraint of his own presence. He did not even come back at the first hearing of news which seemed to make his presence specially needful. In such a mind as William's we may be sure that many motives joined together.

The view from Normandy

It was due to his own native Duchy, which had served him so loyally in his great undertaking, to show himself once more among his own people, and to thank and reward both his earthly and his heavenly helpers. Moreover, as the ruler of two states, it was impossible for him to dwell exclusively in either, and it was doubtless good policy to visit Normandy at this particular moment. His popularity in his native Duchy must now have been at its very highest, but anything which could be construed as neglect of his own land and people might have caused that popularity to cool as it had warmed. The visit to Normandy, [participating in feasts and ceremonies, etc.], were all signs that the King of the English was not puffed up by his new greatness, but that he was still the Duke of the Normans, loving his own land, labouring for its welfare, showing honour to its holy men and its holy places.

The view from England

And as his presence in Normandy was certainly politic, his absence from England may have been politic also.  It was doubtless meant to be taken as a sign of confidence in his new subjects.  King William, a righteous and merciful King, had dealt in all gentleness and tenderness with a people of whom well nigh every man was entangled in the guilt of treason.  He had shown favour and honour to all who had not personally sinned against him; the noblest men of England had been chosen as his companions in his voyage, and they were now the objects of wonder and admiration to his subjects beyond the sea.  A Conqueror who had shed no blood except in battle, who had seized no man's lands or goods save with every legal formality, might affect to trust himself to the good will of his new subjects, and might profess to deem that his actual presence was not needed to secure their obedience.

In his own heart, he may not have been sorry to put their obedience to the test, to see what his chances really were of retaining the part of the land which he had already won, and of winning the rest to a more than nominal subjection.  This policy enabled him directly to prove the disposition of the people at large.  The shires which had submitted were free from the terror of his own presence, and the presence in his train of the Earls of northern and central England left the still-independent districts to their own devices.  I do not believe for a moment that William purposely put England into the hands of oppressive lieutenants, in order that the people might he goaded into revolt.  But it is not unlikely that he may have wished to bring matters to an issue and to learn what the temper of the nation really was.  It is possible that he was not sorry when an imperfect and unsatisfactory state of things was put an end to by the act of others, when he found that, if he meant to be King at all, he must go on with the work of conquest.

The same kind of feeling may have led him not to hurry back at once on the first news of disaffection.  Haste would have implied fear.  It would rather suit his purpose to deal with the isolated movements which took place during his absence as trifles which his lieutenants could easily put down, even if they were not put down by the loyal English themselves.  It was only when he found that the disaffected were intriguing for foreign help, that there was a chance of his having to struggle for his Crown against Swegen of Denmark or some other foreign King, that William thought that the time was come to return to England with all speed.

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  • Integration requires credible leadership - leaders can gain the legitimacy needed to cement an acquisition by observing and respecting the cultural norms of the acquired
  • Trust and authority must be balanced - delegating responsibility demonstrates the leader's confidence in subordinates but must be balanced with personal presence in key moments
  • Keywords:
    merger, conquest, loyalty, power, England, dominion, resistance, rebellion, confidence, obedience, conquest, haste, fear, victory, popularity, leadership, customs, politics, trust, presence, subordinates, delegation, good will, William the Conqueror, 1066, Battle of Hastings, feudalism