The world is facing an energy crisis the likes of which has not been seen since the 1970s and whose effects will last well beyond the events that triggered it. The conflict in the Middle East has created the largest oil supply disruption on record. Some 15 million barrels of oil and petroleum products per day, equivalent to roughly 15% of global consumption, have no alternative route around the Strait of Hormuz. India has lost more than 40% of its crude flows, with state oil companies absorbing losses of more than $100 million per day to shield consumers. Qatar’s Ras Laffan has lost 17% of its liquefied natural gas export capacity, with rebuilding expected to take three to five years. The crisis is also drawing down already strained energy reserves, from the US’ Strategic Petroleum Reserve to global oil inventories and European natural gas storage. Even if the crisis ended today, the damage to the global energy system would take years to repair.
Countries are also facing a broader and increasingly unpredictable set of threats to their energy systems. Deliberate attacks are disrupting production, supply chains, storage, and infrastructure, while geopolitical tensions are making access to critical technologies and resources less secure. The perpetrators range from nation-states and their proxies to individuals acting independently. Securing energy systems therefore means defending the entire energy stack: the fuels and critical minerals they depend on, the technologies that convert them into usable energy, and the physical and digital infrastructure that delivers it. Even wealthy, resource-rich countries can harbor single points of failure, where disruption of essential suppliers, routes, assets, or capabilities can have serious consequences.
The oil shocks of 1973 and 1979 demonstrate how profoundly an energy crisis can change the way countries manage energy security. Those crises prompted the creation of the International Energy Agency, a spot market for crude oil, new vehicle fuel efficiency standards, and strategic petroleum reserves—strengthening collective energy security for decades. Today’s threats demand a broader response: leaders need to take greater responsibility for the security and resilience of their own energy systems. Securing access to energy resources and components is only part of the challenge. Countries also need to protect critical infrastructure, build sufficient redundancy, and prepare their workforce and response capabilities.
Those choices require a long-term commitment. Countries can make decisions today that may take years or even decades to bear fruit. By taking a holistic approach, leaders can find and fortify vulnerabilities before they are tested, mobilize the private sector while limiting the financial burden on taxpayers and ratepayers, and reassess which international partnerships can provide the greatest security. We propose a five-element framework to help governments and businesses make more informed energy security decisions.
Today’s Energy Crisis Requires a Coordinated Response
Recent attacks demonstrate the growing exposure of energy systems to deliberate disruption.
- In North America, reported physical security incidents affecting the grid rose from roughly 2,800 in 2023 to more than 3,500 in 2025.
- In Europe, three of the four Nord Stream pipelines were destroyed in 2022, and more than 10 other undersea cables and pipelines have since been damaged across the Baltic Sea. Malware disrupted remote monitoring of 5,800 German wind turbines at the outset of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
- In the Middle East, during a single week in March 2026, Iranian missiles and drones struck energy infrastructure across four Gulf producers; a drone hit a major refinery in Saudi Arabia; two of Kuwait’s three refineries caught fire; and the UAE’s largest gas plant shut down entirely.
Although these incidents vary in scale and sophistication, all are examples of how attacks on individual assets can create consequences far beyond the assets themselves.
And because countries cannot always know with certainty who will attack, where they will strike, or which vulnerability they will exploit, energy security and resilience needs to be embedded across the system rather than designed around a single anticipated threat.
Vulnerabilities can be hidden within an energy system itself. Renewables can depend on components manufactured predominantly in one country. Critical knowledge can reside with a narrow pool of specialists. Geographically dispersed facilities can have single points of failure, such as the subsea cable connecting an offshore wind farm to shore or the transformer connecting a solar farm to the grid. In each case, what looks resilient at the aggregate level can become vulnerable when dependencies converge on a common point of failure.
Holistic energy security addresses those dependencies as a whole. Rather than optimizing individual parts of the energy system in isolation, it considers how the resources, supply chains, assets, preparedness, and people required to provide energy interact, and what happens to the whole system when one or more of them is disrupted. (See “The Value of a Whole-of-Nation Strategy.”) Because the source and target of the next attack may be difficult to predict, energy security must be built and maintained before it is needed.
The Value of a Whole-of-Nation Strategy
- National orchestration, which sets direction, establishes priorities, and coordinates the national effort.
- Critical functions, which provide the capabilities, infrastructure, and services required for national defense and continuity.
- Societal resilience, which draws on media, academia, NGOs, and citizens to build preparedness and mobilize across society.
The Five Elements of Holistic Energy Security
Every country approaches energy security from a different starting point, but even resource abundance and economic wealth cannot guarantee security. Resource-rich countries are vulnerable to having their critical infrastructure attacked, while most countries depend heavily on foreign resources, technologies, and components that can be disrupted. Understanding a country’s strengths and vulnerabilities therefore requires looking across the energy system. We identify five core elements for assessing and strengthening holistic energy security. (See Exhibit 1.)
Each element involves tradeoffs across risk, cost, and the benefits of greater energy security. They are also interconnected: decisions around one element can shape the options available in others. For example, a country such as Japan with strong infrastructure repair capabilities may choose to invest less in asset hardening. Given the interdependencies and cost involved, no country is likely to fully optimize across all five elements. Instead, leaders must balance investments according to their country’s specific vulnerabilities, resources, and resilience priorities.
1. Domestic Resources: Reduce External Dependence
Domestic production provides the most direct protection against external supply disruption. A country able to produce the resources it consumes, and manufacture and maintain the equipment needed to use them, reduces its dependence on foreign suppliers and trade routes that can be impacted by geopolitical conflict. But no country can produce everything it needs at home, which means energy security depends increasingly on the strength and diversity of external partnerships.
OECD net importers illustrate the challenge. Roughly 60% of OECD countries import more than half of their energy, underscoring the world’s dependence on international energy supply chains. Economic strength can provide access to global markets and the ability to pay for imported energy, but it cannot eliminate the vulnerabilities that come with relying on those supply chains. (See Exhibit 2.)
Historically, domestic energy production has largely been determined by access to molecules and fossil-fuel resources. But low-carbon energy sources are changing that equation. Countries such as Iceland, through geothermal energy, and France, through nuclear power, demonstrate how alternatives to fossil fuels have reduced import dependence. For countries with limited fossil resources, wind and solar are particularly attractive because their availability is less constrained by geology than fossil fuels.
But producing more energy domestically does not necessarily make the broader energy system independent. The equipment required to generate that energy may itself depend on imported components, critical minerals, or manufacturing capacity. Reducing one external dependency can therefore create or increase another.
Pursuing greater self-sufficiency can also come at a premium, adding to the affordability challenge as countries trade lower external dependence for higher costs.
Increasing energy independence can require sustained investment, legislation, and infrastructure development over 10 to 20 years. The US, for example, made greater energy independence a national priority and moved from net importer to net exporter over roughly four decades, supported by investment, policy, and shale development. Israel similarly reduced its import dependence by developing offshore natural gas.
Countries can also move in the opposite direction. Since the early 2010s, the Netherlands has curtailed domestic gas production, Germany has phased out nuclear power, and the UK has constrained oil and gas exploration. These decisions reduced domestic capacity and increased external dependence, creating greater exposure when conditions change. While countries cannot choose their resource endowment, they can make deliberate, long-term choices about how much domestic capacity to develop and retain.
2. Asset Resilience: Reduce Concentration Risk
Energy infrastructure is increasingly a deliberate target in today’s conflicts. Asset resilience requires countries to consider how their infrastructure is distributed, protected, and connected, and how much of the system would remain operational if critical assets were deliberately targeted.
Our analysis of three large countries with a similar number of power stations shows that targeted attacks can have very different consequences depending on how capacity is distributed across assets. (See Exhibit 3.) Countries with a greater share of generating capacity concentrated in their largest power stations were more vulnerable to losing substantial capacity from a small number of successful infrastructure attacks.
In one scenario, just ten successful attacks could take nearly a third of generating capacity offline. But the risks extend well beyond power generation. The disruption of other energy assets, including pipelines, interconnectors, substations, transformers, transmission lines, and storage facilities, can lead to disproportionate impacts on the grid and economy. This is particularly the case when those assets are difficult to replace or protect.
Power station size is one factor that affects asset vulnerability, but other considerations can be equally important. Distributed energy generation, such as wind farms, may be harder to disable with a single strike but still have single points of vulnerability. Consider, for example, the export cables that carry offshore wind power to the coast or the transformers that receive it. In some cases, a single large power station may be easier to defend, using protective measures such as anti-drone mesh or missile-intercepting batteries.
To prioritize investments in asset resilience, planners will need to understand the criticality of each asset. How quickly could it be repaired or replaced after an attack? How essential is it to the grid? What is the cost of building redundancy through backup transformers, alternative pipeline routes, or other infrastructure?
Cyber threats add another dimension to asset resilience. Cyber attacks on energy infrastructure have increased sharply since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. (See Exhibit 4.) Known incidents only capture a fraction of the threat due to significant underreporting. Within that growing threat, industrial ransomware has accelerated, with the number of ransomware groups increasing almost 50% from 2024 to 2025 and affecting thousands of organizations, according to the cybersecurity firm Dragos. In July 2026, a cyber attack reportedly carried out by Iran-linked hackers shut down a small-scale UK power station for four days. Interconnected digital systems can amplify the exposure, allowing vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure and control systems to become points of failure.
The appropriate approach depends on the asset and the economics. For both physical and cyber assets, governments can weigh the cost of hardening or redundancy against the cost of losing and rebuilding the asset, and the economic value that could be lost if it is offline.
3. Cross-Border Collaboration: Invest in International Partnerships
Where domestic production falls short, partnerships fill the gap. But the choice of partner can introduce new vulnerabilities. Building energy security requires countries to be deliberate about where they depend on partners and which partners they choose. (See Exhibit 5.)
Energy partnerships can serve different purposes: securing the lowest-cost supply, accessing resources for which no viable substitute exists, providing redundancy when primary supply is disrupted, relying on partners with a demonstrated record of trust, and so forth. Few partnerships can optimize across all of these dimensions at once.
Germany’s pivot away from Russian gas illustrates the considerations involved. Germany leaned more heavily on Norway because it was an extension of an existing trusted relationship that could deliver on short notice, even if it came at a high cost and greater level of single-supplier dependence. Germany effectively traded cost and supplier diversification for trust, redundancy, and greater security. (See Exhibit 6.)
There is no silver-bullet solution. Energy security comes from being deliberate about which drivers matter most at a given moment, and what a country is willing to concede to secure its priorities.
4. Supply Chain Resilience: Diversify Dependencies
Countries can reduce trade and supply chain exposure by sourcing energy from multiple suppliers, maintaining strategic reserves, and developing alternative routes to market. But multiple suppliers can still depend on the same transit route, geography, infrastructure, or dominant producer, leaving a single point of failure capable of disrupting them all.
In Japan, for example, 95% of its crude oil historically comes from four Middle Eastern countries, providing diversity at the supplier level. Yet those barrels share a critical dependency: the Strait of Hormuz. Disruption there could simultaneously compromise supply from several of Japan’s largest sources. Other routes through Southeast Asia create additional chokepoints, although some can be circumvented at additional time and cost. The critical test, therefore, is whether different suppliers and supply routes would remain viable under the same disruption. (See Exhibit 7.)
The appropriate action depends on whether alternatives exist. Some flows can be redirected through existing infrastructure, as demonstrated by the rapid use of Saudi Arabia’s East-West Pipeline (Petroline) and the UAE’s Habshan pipeline. But these routes have limited capacity and cannot fully replace shipments through Hormuz. Countries exposed to these chokepoints need to prepare in advance by increasing domestic production where possible, diversifying toward suppliers that use different routes, and bolstering strategic reserves. Secondary chokepoints, such as the Lombok Strait, can be circumvented, albeit at additional cost and transit time. Here, resilience depends more on preplanned alternative routes and suppliers, contingency contracts, and sufficient reserves to absorb longer transit times.
Supply chain vulnerabilities also extend beyond the immediate flow of energy. As countries turn to renewables, they become increasingly reliant on the components and manufacturing capacity needed to build their domestic energy system. It is well documented that China holds a leading position across the solar supply chain, from polysilicon and cells to panels, inverters, and batteries. China also controls about 90% of the world’s capacity to refine rare earth minerals. This concentration gives it significant leverage over global supply, with the potential for significant disruptions to access to these critical materials. In other words, a country can reduce its dependence on imported fossil fuels while still remaining exposed to concentrated technology supply chains. But the risks unfold on different timelines. Disruptions to fuel flows can affect energy availability immediately, while shortages of critical components may take longer to constrain infrastructure development, maintenance, and replacement.
Supply chain resilience therefore requires understanding where dependencies converge and whether viable alternatives exist. Where they do, countries can establish alternative routes, suppliers, and contingency arrangements in advance.
5. Homefront Preparation: Prepare Before a Crisis
Even the best-protected energy system will experience disruption. The difference between a temporary shock and a prolonged crisis can depend on decisions made months or years before the disruption occurs. Homefront preparation is therefore about ensuring that countries have the resources, capabilities, workforce, and plans to sustain essential energy services while damaged infrastructure is restored or alternative supply comes online.
The key is deciding in advance how an energy system will operate when supply is constrained. Countries need plans to prioritize energy users and essential services, ration scarce supply, and coordinate the response across government, industry, and the public. Crucially, they need to test those plans through drills and simulation exercises involving stakeholders throughout the energy supply chain and end users before a crisis occurs.
IEA members are required to maintain oil stocks equivalent to at least 90 days of net imports, and many hold substantially more. Countries are also taking a more strategic approach to stockpiling other energy commodities and critical components. Japan, for example, is expanding its reserves of naphtha and diesel, reflecting a shift from just-in-time supply chains toward just-in-case preparedness.
Good preparation also means building the capabilities needed to respond when disruption occurs. Countries should invest in critical workforce skills, strengthen security screening for sensitive roles, establish protocols for managing and restoring sites after an attack, and determine in advance when government intervention or rationing should be triggered. Some of these capabilities cannot be built or repurposed quickly. If a capability such as refining defense-specific fuels does not already exist, establishing it can take two to three years. Waiting for a disruption to expose a missing capability can therefore leave a country with few immediate options, regardless of how much capital it is prepared to deploy after the fact.
Preparation also applies to personnel. A critical capability may depend on a small number of certified specialists, an aging workforce with too few successors, or contractors whose availability is not guaranteed during a crisis. Building workforce depth takes time. Even without an explicit focus on holistic energy resilience, the US energy workforce grew by roughly 20% to 30% over two decades, while the UK moved in the opposite direction. If workforce readiness becomes a strategic priority, governments and businesses will need to act deliberately to accelerate workforce growth, talent development, and succession planning well before those capabilities are tested. (See Exhibit 8.)
The experience following the oil shocks of the 1970s demonstrates the value of institutionalizing that preparation. The creation of the IEA and mandated strategic petroleum reserves turned lessons from a crisis into enduring mechanisms for managing future supply disruptions. Today’s challenge is broader: preparedness must account not only for oil shortages, but for disruption across fuels, electricity, components, infrastructure, and supply chains. And because many of those systems cross borders, preparation cannot be undertaken by countries entirely in isolation.
Implications for Governments and the Private Sector
Best-in-class energy security requires deliberate, coordinated action by governments and the private sector. Because countries have different starting positions and cannot invest equally across all five elements, leaders must prioritize the assets and capabilities most critical to their energy systems, determining where to focus resources and when to act. Governments can then set the level of security their countries require and create the conditions to achieve it, while private companies provide much of the capital, infrastructure, technology, and capabilities needed to deliver it.
Implications for Governments. Governments can strengthen energy security by using clear principles to determine which parts of the energy system to fortify and assess the costs involved. They can also decide which capabilities to secure domestically and where reliable international partnerships can provide greater security.
- Measure energy security, identify gaps, and prioritize investment. Government leaders can assess current energy security across the five elements and benchmark it against evidence from real crises to identify vulnerabilities. They can then determine which gaps are most important to address and where the benefits of greater security justify the cost, even when doing so adds to affordability pressures. For example, governments may decide to invest in the domestic energy sector workforce through more apprenticeships and vocational training.
- Build reliable international partnerships. Governments can determine which countries to partner with, for which resources and capabilities, and under what conditions. Partnerships may be driven by economic interests, mutual dependence, and shared vulnerabilities, and they can change as bargaining positions, geopolitical alliances, and energy needs evolve. Governments may therefore assess not only whether a partner is reliable today, but whether the relationship is likely to remain reliable under stress, and where alternative partners or capabilities are needed.
- Mobilize private-sector investment. Governments cannot deliver holistic energy security through public budgets alone. Even where energy assets are state-owned, they still depend on private supply chains, contractors, equipment, and capabilities. Governments can offer grants and other incentives to make strategic energy investments, such as storage, electrification, and decentralized grids, more attractive. Regulatory minimums and design requirements, such as vendor prequalification, can also support greater energy security. Mechanisms like these can make investments in redundancy commercially attractive for private actors.
Implications for the Private Sector. With the right government incentives in place, private operators have three primary ways to capture value:
- Invest. Redirect capital toward asset categories made more attractive by government incentives and security requirements.
- Partner. Position the company to become a preferred executor of energy security contracts, while using partnerships or M&A to acquire the necessary capabilities.
- Innovate. Develop new products and services that meet new mandates or differentiate the company from competitors.
To capture this value effectively, businesses will need to strengthen their policy capabilities by embedding policy expertise into all functions—enhancing how they plan for, and then manage, the resulting risks. And as the business case for holistic energy security improves, new value pools can emerge, creating further incentives for companies to invest. These include:
- Public procurement contracts that create new revenue streams.
- Security-as-a-service offerings that turn standby or backup capacity into revenue.
- New markets for more resilient infrastructure, including underground substations, standardized replacement parts, and undersea pipelines.
Private operators can also evaluate their own energy security across the five elements through the lens of competitive positioning and shareholder value. That could mean ensuring that competitive advantages are defensible, investing in domestic manufacturing or maintenance capabilities, diversifying investment risk across asset classes, restructuring supply chains for resilience, investing in physical asset hardening and redundancy, building greater cyber resilience, or developing the talent required to operate and recover during disruption.
The Question of Affordability
The cost of greater energy security will ultimately be borne by taxpayers through public budgets, ratepayers through utility bills, or shareholders through the cost of investment and ownership. Ratepayers already bear a significant share. In 2025, the UK’s Ofgem approved £28 billion of investment in gas and electricity networks, as part of a planned £90 billion through 2031, funded through charges on customer bills. That dwarfs the government’s £1.3 billion per year taxpayer-funded home energy efficiency program.
That additional burden comes at a time when electricity is already more expensive for households. Between 2019 and 2024, household electricity prices rose by an average of 36% across the EU and 26% in the US.
How much countries spend will depend in part on how much of the energy system they deem too critical to fail. As more assets and services are designated critical, and the required level of security rises, so will the cost that must ultimately be absorbed by taxpayers, ratepayers, or shareholders.
Affordability will therefore be an explicit consideration in decisions about how much energy security to build and how to fund it. Governments can determine where the benefits of additional security justify the costs, and who should bear those costs. The question of who pays should be an intentional choice, rather than a consequence of whichever intervention is cheapest, easiest, or quickest to implement.
As threats become more varied and deliberate, countries need a decisive approach to identify vulnerabilities and strengthen security across the energy system. Strength in one area cannot fully compensate for weakness in another. A country may have abundant domestic resources but vulnerable infrastructure, diversified suppliers but shipments pass through the same maritime chokepoint, or sufficient generating capacity but too few skilled workers to restore it after an attack. The five elements therefore need to be considered as a whole, rather than as independent measures of security.
Governments cannot deliver that security alone. They will need to work with one another and especially with the private sector to turn energy security priorities into action. The choices countries make now about how much security to build, where to collaborate, and what they are willing to pay will determine the security of their energy systems for decades to come.
The authors would like to express their thanks to Chris Yu for supporting the analysis.
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