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The geopolitical order is clearly shifting, and it is often asserted that the world has become “multipolar.” Previous eras of multipolarity, where power is spread across multiple countries and regions, created spheres of opportunity for countries and their companies, as well as significant restrictions on their freedom of action.

But is the world today truly multipolar? To understand the answer, executive leaders must understand what constitutes “power” and “poles” in an era of fast-changing economic and trade dynamics, shifting alliances, widely dispersed control over critical natural resources and industrial technologies, and increasingly asymmetric warfare.

To help leaders identify poles and measure their influence, we have developed the BCG Institute Power Index. Our methodology analyzes data spanning more than 50 indicators across three dimensions through which nations can build power: economic, military, and soft power. It also allows us to track how the keys to global power have changed historically along with shifts in polarity, going back as far as the early 20th century and even to the early 19th century for some metrics. (See the sidebar “Our Methodology.”)

Our Methodology
The BCG Institute Power Index spans 52 indicators to measure three dimensions through which a state projects power and shapes the international order—economic, military, and soft power. Technology and governance are treated as enablers that amplify power when mediated through the three dimensions. The index ranges from a minimum of 0 to a maximum of 100, with the latter reflecting a hypothetical total control of resources.

We define five historical periods that were delineated by structural shifts in the international system:
  • 1816–1869: British industrial hegemony and European military competition following the Congress of Vienna
  • 1870–1945: The expansion of the Industrial Revolution and world wars
  • 1946–1990: The Cold War
  • 1991–2013: “Pax Americana” following the collapse of the Soviet Union through the recovery from the Great Financial Crisis
  • 2014–present: Emerging alternatives, marked by China’s launch of the Belt and Road Initiative, the rapid deterioration of US-China trade and political relations, along with Russia’s military annexation of Crimea in 2014 and full-scale invasion of Ukraine beginning in 2022
Indicators were selected to capture the most relevant measures of capability within each power dimension during each historical period. Because the nature of power shifts across eras and data availability varies, the indicator set is not identical for all periods. Instead, we include indicators for a given period only where data is available for that entire period.

Weighting
Economic power in our composite index is weighted at 45%, military power at 30%, and soft power at 25%. This is a qualitative judgement on our part and is easily adjusted in our proprietary model. The higher economic weight reflects the inclusion of technological inputs for production, such as AI, semiconductors, and leadership in quantum computing development. These capabilities also have significant downstream impacts on military capability and soft power projection.

Within dimensions, weighting is kept even across measures. Weighting is also even across indicators within each measure. The one exception is economic scale and financial power, which is split 50-50 between GDP versus non-GDP measures, given the importance of GDP as a measure of economic scale.

Indicators Used in Scoring
The indicators used for each dimension include the following, which we use to calculate the share of the global total controlled by each power:
  • Economic Power. GDP, export volumes, capital markets depth, fiscal health, currency use in global reserves, human capital, iron and steel production, energy resources, infrastructure investment, R&D investment, control of critical minerals, semiconductor production capacity, control over AI models, and quantum computing.
  • Military Power. Military personnel, military expenditures, overseas military deployments, arms production, nuclear arsenal, automated warfare capability, cyberwarfare readiness, and control of space and intelligence, security, and reconnaissance platforms.
  • Soft Power. Contributions to the United Nations, World Bank, and IMF; UN peacekeeping participation; provision of development aid; cross-border investment; formal alliances and treaties; UN voting and seats on the UN Security Council; exports of cultural goods and services; inbound international students; attractiveness to immigrants; digital platform penetration; and control over media narratives.
Defining Poles
A “pole” is defined as any state, empire, or coordinated bloc that scores 10 or above on the composite index or at least 15 in one or more of the economic, military, or soft power dimensions. In practice, the set of powers identified across our historical dataset are identical. This threshold sets a “great power” threshold that is higher than in some academic literature1 and distinguishes between states that define the structure of the international system and those that operate within it.

We validated this threshold against two periods where the polarity characterization is broadly accepted by historians and political scientists:
  • 1939 (multipolar): The USSR, US, British Empire, and the Third Reich all meet the threshold; France and Japan do not—consistent with the consensus characterization.
  • 1946–1990 (bipolar): The US and USSR meet the threshold; China in 1970 does not—preserving the bipolar characterization.
Data Sources
We used a wide range of credible third-party sources, including but not limited to the following.
  • Economic and industrial capability:
    • GDP data from the Maddison Project (historical) and the World Bank (modern)
    • Trade and financial data from the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund, and World Bank, covering export volumes, capital markets depth, foreign reserve currency composition, and fiscal health
    • Strategic resource and technology indicators from BP/Energy Institute Statistical Review of World Energy, the US Geological Survey, the Peterson Institute for International Economics, Semiconductor Equipment and Materials International, and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, covering energy production, critical mineral reserves, semiconductor fabrication capacity, and quantum computing investment
  • Military capability:
    • Historical military personnel and expenditure data from the Correlates of War project (from 1816) supplemented by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute for the modern period
    • Force projection indicators from the IISS, covering overseas deployments and equipment inventories
    • Strategic and emerging domain capabilities from the Federation of American Scientists, Teal Group, the Belfer Center, and the Union of Concerned Scientists, covering nuclear arsenals, autonomous warfare capacity, cyber readiness, and military space assets
  • Soft power and global influence:
    • Alliance and diplomatic data from the Correlates of War project (from 1816) and the Lowy Institute, covering formal alliances, intergovernmental organization membership, and diplomatic networks
    • International institutional contributions from the United Nations, World Bank, IMF, and Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development and country-specific sources for key powers, covering capital contributions, peacekeeping participation, and development assistance
    • Cultural reach from UNESCO and Gallup, covering cultural exports, international students, and attractiveness to immigrants
Note:
1. For example, in the book Why Nations Rise: Narratives and the Path to Great Power, Chatterjee Miller defines a great power as controlling 5% to 10% of global military power.

Our analysis shows that the US currently has a strong lead militarily, while China is essentially its economic equal. Europe leads on soft power and, when united and acting in a coordinated way, can be considered a pole—despite lagging the US and China in the military and economic dimensions.

The index also reveals the crucial role that alliances play in global power dynamics. These alliances can broaden, deepen, and amplify the projection of power much more quickly than any single power can strengthen or weaken through organic growth or decline. Using the index, it is possible to test different alliance-based scenarios for the current structure of global power. As mentioned, Europe, allied and united, would be a pole in itself. And if Europe were tightly allied with the US, this North Atlantic pole would vastly outrank China across all three dimensions. Against a divided US and Europe, however, a tightly aligned China and Russia pole would roughly rank as the US’s equal in the index when all three dimensions are combined.

For leaders in governments, businesses, and international organizations, these considerations are not merely theoretical. Although a truly multipolar world has not been a reality since before the Second World War, today it would create a cascade of impacted markets, supply chains, and regulatory implications. Leaders who are aware of these geopolitical dynamics will be best positioned to adapt to the changes.

The Core Drivers of Power

The BCG Institute Power Index brings together the following factors to assess the economic, military, and soft power of nations and alliances. We also consider two capabilities that enable the projection of power through these three dimensions—namely, control over strategic technologies and the characteristics of governing institutions. (See Exhibit 1.)

The BCG Institute Power Index Assesses Three Power Dimensions and Two Key Enablers

Projecting economic, military, and soft power assets into achieving global influence requires several enablers. Among the most important are:

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Tracking Power Shifts of the Past

The BCG Institute Power Index identifies the global balance of power between poles over more than a century. (See Exhibit 2.)

The World Hasn't Been This Multipolar Since Before World War 2

What do we mean by a “pole”? A pole is a nation-state (or cluster of nation-states) that meets a threshold level of power in the international system. We define a pole as scoring 10 or above on the composite index or 15 in one or more of the economic, military, or soft power dimensions. This threshold is consistent with both our analysis of historical periods of multipolarity and assessment of key academic literature. For instance:

Where the World Order Stands Now

Today, the world is more multipolar than it has been since before World War II, and the commercial openness that defined the post–Cold War era is eroding. Tariff and non-tariff barriers are proliferating based on geography, technology, and company origin, fragmenting the commercial landscape in ways not seen in decades. The US remains on top, with a composite score of 19 in 2025, but China, in second position, has rapidly gained ground, with a score of 14. Yet neither the US nor China leads in all three dimensions, and so they must work with allies if they wish to achieve many strategic aims at a global level. (See Exhibit 3.)

The US and China Are Currently the World's Leading Powers

Europe—defined here as the 27 members of the European Union, along with the UK and the four members of the European Free Trade Association—is a pole, assuming that it can act in a coordinated manner. It generally does so on trade and economic policy. The region, however, is no longer as closely aligned with the US. Meanwhile, Russia and India do not rank as poles on a global level, with composite scores of 4 and 3, respectively. But we still regard them as key powers, given their unique roles in world affairs, particularly in their regions of influence (see below). In addition to these five key powers, several other nations wield significant global and regional influence on certain issues, but working in concert with other nations gives them better leverage.

The US. As a global economic power, our index shows the US virtually tied with China overall and well ahead of Europe. But the tie with China masks different sources of power. In addition to the larger nominal US GDP, the use of the US dollar as a global reserve currency, which has accounted for around 60% of global foreign reserves, has been a durable source of global US financial power. This allows the US to exert control over international payments systems and influence specific geopolitical situations through economic and financial sanctions. The US also wields influence over international financial institutions through its deep capital markets. Technologically, the US dominates advanced semiconductor design and is a leader in AI. Although quantum computing is in its early stages, the US is a global leader in investment and patents around this technology, giving it the potential to disrupt cryptography, material science, and other fields.

From a military perspective, the US is roughly twice as powerful as China, particularly in its ability to project military force. Key advantages are its unmatched global network of bases, nuclear capabilities, and alliances in Asia, the Middle East, and Europe.

On soft power, the US remains highly influential. Its alliance network is the world’s most extensive, its universities attract more international students than any single country, and US-based digital platforms exert near-global dominance of online discourse.

China. Our index ranks China roughly tied economically with the US but with a different set of advantages. It has a dominant share of global manufacturing and goods exports, particularly in key sectors such as EVs, batteries, and renewable energy systems. And it is the only major competitor to the US in frontier technologies such as AI models. China also controls 60% to 90% of processing capacity for metals and minerals that are critical to energy transition, defense manufacturing, and consumer electronics. However, the renminbi remains far from being a global reserve currency, reflecting only about 2% of international reserves. Meaningful internationalization would require China to open its capital account significantly and make the renminbi convertible, which would carry domestic risks that the central government so far has been unwilling to accept.

In the defense domain, China spends around half as much on its military than the US and lacks the overseas bases and alliances needed to project significant military power globally. But it is a superpower in its region. And in terms of soft power, China has leveraged its financial resources for development assistance programs such as the Belt and Road Initiative, which funds and builds infrastructure projects around the world. Powerful Chinese digital e-commerce and social media platforms, meanwhile, generate significant global cultural influence.

Europe. When the countries we include in Europe act together, Europe ranks as a pole, with a composite score of 13. When these countries act individually, however, the region loses global influence. Taken alone, Germany, the UK, and France, for example, each have composite scores of 2, behind Russia, Japan, and India.

A cohesive Europe can help shape global systems across several dimensions. Europe leads all other poles in soft power, supported by institutional maturity, substantial development assistance, extensive diplomatic networks, and broad cultural reach. Although an integrated Europe is the world’s largest consumer market, it lags behind the US and China as a global economic power. The euro accounts for around 20% of the world’s reserves, but the Eurozone countries do not have an integrated fiscal policy to match the ECB’s unified monetary policy. Militarily, a combined Europe (minus NATO allies US, Canada, and Türkiye) is about on par with China and slightly more powerful than Russia. However, deploying its military capability requires political consensus among many governments, a constraint neither Russia nor China face. 

Russia. Although Russia doesn’t meet our index’s definition of a pole, with a composite score of 4, it remains a key power—particularly in the military domain. Its nuclear arsenal accounts for nearly half of the world’s deployed strategic warheads, and its 1.3-million-strong standing military gives it formidable conventional capability in its region. Russia’s energy exports provide additional economic leverage across parts of Eastern Europe, South Asia, and beyond. However, its economic base has weakened considerably under sanctions related to the conflict in Ukraine as well as structural challenges, and its soft power reach remains limited.

India. With a composite score of 3, India is not yet a pole but is arguably the power with the greatest potential to become one. It has the world’s largest population, a fast-growing economy, and a wealth of technical talent. In recent decades, it has deepened ties with both Western and non-Western partners. Since 2007, India has participated in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (known as the Quad) alongside the US, Australia, and Japan, while simultaneously maintaining long-standing defense and energy relationships with Russia. This strategic flexibility, combined with its growing economic weight, makes India’s trajectory and alignment choices important to watch.

Other Significant Powers. In addition to the five key powers, the next five powers according to our index are an eclectic group. They have different sources of power and different economic and political relationships with the US, China, and Europe.

Outside of the top ten, there are several considerable powers, including Indonesia, Nigeria, Brazil, and Saudi Arabia. These nations have different economic, military, and soft power trajectories, but they can play critical roles not only in their regions but also on a global scale.

How Alliances Redefine the Power Balance

Because the balance of economic, military, and soft power is so dispersed, the ability to project power depends increasingly on a nation’s or region’s choices of allies—rather than just on their individual underlying capabilities. But as decades-old alignments now erode and become more transactional, the configurations of such alliances frequently shift, and their futures are harder to predict.

We explore several hypothetical scenarios of what the global balance of power might look like under different configurations of partners. These scenarios are nonexhaustive, and other cooperation axes could also shape future dynamics.

These three configurations would entail dramatically different implications for business leaders in terms of market access, tech stack choices, supply chain decisions, and many other factors. But by understanding the impact of these configurations on an organization, CEOs can measure their exposure to possible futures and plan accordingly.

Configuration 1: US and Europe are formally aligned, but China and Russia are not. If combined, the US and Europe would represent a pole roughly twice as powerful as China, with a composite score of 32 versus 14. (See Exhibit 4.) A US-Europe alliance would dominate every dimension. On its own, China would remain competitive economically—albeit less so than the North Atlantic duo. However, the US and Europe would be around three times more powerful than China militarily and in terms of soft power. Russia would lag significantly in each dimension.

The US and Europe Would Be the Dominant World Power If Aligned

Configuration 2: China and Russia are aligned, but US and Europe are decoupled. A pole consisting of China and Russia, with a composite score of 18, would be only slightly less powerful than the US on its own and far more powerful than a unified Europe. (See Exhibit 5.) Although there is no de facto alliance in place at present, China and Russia combined would have more economic power than the US while lagging behind in military capability and soft power. A united Europe would still count as a pole, with a composite score of 13, primarily as the leader in soft power. But Europe’s economic and military gap with a hypothetical China-Russia pole would be considerably wider than if China and Russia acted individually. As potential allies, India, Japan, South Korea, Türkiye, Brazil, Saudi Arabia, and Indonesia would carry disproportionate weight in areas such as trade, technology policy, security cooperation, and regional issues. But these nations would be well behind the other poles in all three dimensions.

An Aligned China and Russia Would Rival the US as a Global Power

Configuration 3: China and Russia remain aligned, but US acts independently of a unified bloc of its traditional military allies. A bloc consisting of the nations with whom the US has mutual defense agreements but excluding the US itself—NATO members and Asia-Pacific nations, including Australia, Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines—would have a composite score of 22. (See Exhibit 6.) As such, it would be slightly more powerful than the US and a unified China and Russia, with composite scores of 19 and 18, respectively. This new bloc would also dominate in soft power and be closely competitive with the other two poles in economic and military power.

US Defense Allies Would Form the Largest Pole Even Without the US

Adapting to a Multipolar World

There is no question that the global balance of power is shifting. While we may not be in a truly multipolar world at present, the “unipolar moment”—in which so many of our current leaders came of age—is clearly over.

History shows that when polarity shifts, governments are driven to adapt national economic policies to the emerging international reality. And that can create both risk and opportunity for companies, wherever they are headquartered and operate. The end of World War I brought commercial benefits to the victors, as the US, UK, and France redrew the world map in their favor, providing rich rewards to their national companies. Today’s evolving multipolar order presents several imperatives for decision makers aiming to avoid being left behind:


History has shown that when polarity shifts, government policy can shift too—often quickly. These shifts can have real and sudden impacts on the ability of firms to operate internationally. Trade routes that were open for decades can close within months or even days. Technology partnerships that were routine can become restricted. Supply chains that were optimized for efficiency can become liabilities.

Understanding the dependence of a firm’s operations on nations away from its home base—where it purchases, where it transforms or adds value, and in which markets it sells—is no longer merely a compliance exercise. It is essential to ensuring competitiveness in the years ahead.


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BCG’s Center for Geopolitics brings clarity to the shifting complexities of global power dynamics, unlocking opportunities for growth and collaboration worldwide. By integrating deep geopolitical expertise with BCG’s renowned analytical capabilities, we deliver business-focused and actionable insights that foster open dialogue and equip the world’s top organizations and their leaders with tools to navigate uncertainty with resilience and confidence. Partnering with industry and functional experts across BCG, we cut through the noise with data-driven analysis, offering business leaders strategic and timely responses to emerging challenges, today’s realities, and tomorrow’s scenarios. For more information, please visit the Center for Geopolitics.